




Transporta nelaimes gadījumu un incidentu izmeklēšanas birojs

Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau of the Republic of Latvia

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Simplified report Nr. 1-2020

Collision of Faroe Islands vessel NOSSAN with Latvian fishing vessel MARITA in Baltic Sea on 15th July 2020



Marine Investigation department

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

Appr – approximately

BRM- Bridge Resource Management

ECDIS - Electronic Chart Display and Information System

iaw-in according with

fv-fishing vessel

kn-knots

lt - local time

mv- motorvessel

nm – nautical miles

VTS -Vessels Traffic Services

TAIIB - Transport Accident and incident Investigation Bureau

1. Preamble

1.1. The sole objective of the investigation of an accident shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor to apportion blame.

1.2. Latvian TAIIB has received an initial notification about collision between fishing vessel MARITA and Faroe island flagged general cargo vessel NOSSAN in vicinity of port of Ventspils from Ventspils VTS operator by phone call 11:48 lt on 15 July 2020.

2. Narrative

Mv NOSSAN: On 15 July 2020 general cargo vessel NOSSAN was proceeding from port of Nyshamn to port of Riga with ETA 07.00 LT on 16 July 2020. At about 10:00 LT NOSSAN was in vicinity of port of Venstpils (appr 15 nm from western coast of Latvia) heading to the entrance of Irben straight (general course North-East). Master was on watch and keeping a sole watchkeeping. All means of propulsion, navigation and control was working properly.

FV MARITA: Latvian fishing vessel MARITA went from port of Pavilosta at 03:00 lt and was working in vicinity of port of Ventspils engaged with trawls set out for fishing. MARITA has hoisted a shape consisting of two cones with their apexes together in a vertical line one above the other iaw COLREG Rule 26. At around 10:00 MARITA was in vicinity of port of Venstpils (appr 15 nm from western coast of Latvia) heading South/South-East with the speed 3 knots. Master was on watch on the bridge, keeping sole watchkeeping. All means of propulsion, navigation and control was working properly.



Image1: Visualization of geographical location of the accident and mutual movement NOSSAN-MARITA

Nossan & Marita : Master of Marita has noticed NOSSAN on close quarter situation at distance 5-6 nm and has started to call her at VHF 16 channel 16. NOSSAN has not respond/has not changed course. At 10:16 Master of Marita has realised the imminence of collision and has started manoeuvre turning helm hard-to-port in order to avoid from unresponsive NOSSAN. At around 10:20 NOSSAN has tangentially collided with the aft part of MARITA damaging superstructure. After collision NOSSAN has not decreased speed, has not changed course, continuing her voyage to port of Riga, where NOSSAN has arrived at 06.00 on 16 of July and consequently detained by Latvian Coast Guard. MARITA has hoisted all her trawls and immediately departed to port of Pavilosta, reporting the accident to Ventspils Port authorities..

3. Facts

Ships' particulars:

Vessel's name	NOSSAN
IMO Number	8814536
Call sign	OZ2127
Type of ship	General cargo

Flag	Faroe Islands
Registered owner	THUN SHIP MANEGEMENT
Registered operator	ERIC THUN AB
Classification Society	Lloyd's register
Gross Tonnage	4250 t
Net Tonnage	2228 t
Registered length	88 m
Registered width	14,5
Draft	5 m
Place and year of building	China, 1990
Hull material	Steel
Engine Power	1690 kW
Crew	9

Ships' particulars:

Vessel's name	MARITA
IMO Number	8923260
Call sign	YL2385
Type of ship	Fishing vessel
Flag	Latvia
Registered owner	NORD STAR FISHER LTD.
Registered operator	NORD STAR FISHER LTD
Classification Society	Russian Maritime Register
Gross Tonnage	112 t
Net Tonnage	30 t

Registered length	25 m
Registered width	7.1m
Draft	3.5 m
Year of building	1985
Hull material	Steel
Engine Power	368 kW
Crew	5

Weather conditions:

Weather forecast for Baltic Sea in accordance with the data from "Latvian Environment, Geology and Meteorology Centre":

At time period from 07.00 till 20.00, 15 July 2020; West, South-West direction wind 5-10 m/s, clear visibility, no precipitations

In accordance with MARITA Master's report, the factual weather conditions were; West wind 4-5 m/s, sea state 2, full daily visibility.

4. Description

In accordance with collated AIS playback submitted by Latvian Coast Guard, written statements of crews:

Events in chronological order:

1. At 06.00 MARITA arrives in fishing area westerly from the port of Ventspils (at around 20 nm from shore) , hoists "fishing cone" on her mast's starboard side, sets up trawls and commences fishing operations. Her speed in 2 kn in average, general course Southward.
2. At 09.45 Nossan arrives in area of westerly from the port of Ventspils (at around 20 nm from shore) and proceeding on clear close quarter course with MARITA.



Image2: Fishing cone, hoisted on MARITA mast starboard side iaw COLREG Rule 26 “vessel engaged in fishing”.

3. At 09:55 Master of MARITA notices close quarter situation with NOSSAN (appr 2.5-1.5 nm away) (also seeing her name on AIS screen) and calls on VHF Channel 16 NOSSAN in order to attract her attention and avoid close quarter situation. NOSSAN does not respond.



Image 3: AIS playback’s snapshot of collision moment. MARITA’s trajectory exposes avoidance manoeuvre 1-3 minutes before collision.

4. At 10: 17 Master of MARITA puts helm “ hard to port” and increase engine power to “full ahead” (putting fishing gear on risk of damage)
5. At 10: 20 MARITA and NOSSAN collides; NOSSAN’s bow hits aft superstructure of Marita.

6. At 10:21 and after NOSSAN continues his voyage. No respond, none changes of course.



Image 4: Damaged part of MARITA on her aft



Image 5: NOSSAN' bulb with visible scratches on. Photo has taken by Coast Guard shortly after collision with MARITA

5. Analysis

5.1 Activities on the vessel's bridge prior the accident.

5.1.1. NOSSAN: Master with 30 years of seagoing experience was as the sole watchkeeper on the bridge. He has taken the watch at 08.00, two hours before the collision. All equipment (including ARPA radar) was fully operational. Autopilot was “on”. According to Master, he fully controlled the situation and haven't noticed any extraordinary events during the transit.

Remark: vessel is not VDR equipped

Vessel's voyage plan: There was ready and Master's approved voyage plan written on paper as well as within the ECDIS.



Image 6: Snapshot of NOSSAN voyage plan and factual transit in ECDIS.

Entry in NOSSAN logbook regarding collision: “Small collision with fv”

5.1.2. MARITA Master with 20 years of seagoing experience was as the sole watchkeeper on the bridge. He has taken the watch at 03.00. All equipment (including ARPA radar) was fully operational. All crew was working on deck with fishing gears (trawls)

MARITA was proceeding with the course 170, speed 3, operating trawls. Daily shape fishing cone was up.

5.2. Human erroneous actions and omissions

Omissions before and during the accident:

5.2.1. absence of effective situational control on the NOSSAN bridge (including radio comms attendance)

Erroneous actions:

5.2.6. NOSSAN Master's failure to act in order to give way to MARITA iaw COLREG Rule 18.

5.2.7. NOSSAN Master's failure to report accident, as well as to evaluate consequences of collision immediately on site.

5.3. Hazardous material involvement

NIL

5.4. Environmental impact

NIL

5.5. Equipment failures

MARITA superstructure is damaged. App 1,5 x 1,5 meters of impacted area.

5.6. External factors

Weather was not the factor during the accident

5.7. Contributing factors of the accident involving human performance, shipboard operations, shore management or regulatory procedures:

Factors as **crew fatigue, lack of competence or shortages on shipboard operations** could not be clearly articulated as the contributory factors of the accident. All vessels' conventionally required and presented paperwork like checklists, working-rest lists, plans, graphs etc. have been held according to standards (regarding to conventional standards).

6. Conclusions

6.1. The accident happened due to NOSSAN Master's inactivity in framework of standard BRM (possible lack of VHF comms, lack of situational awareness)

6.2. Master has performed sole watchkeeping during the occurrence. Sole watchkeeping is allowed by conventional standards (Ref. B: STCW Code Part A / Section A-VIII/1/ PART 4 – 1 WATCHKEEPING AT SEA) however, there are several very considerable restrictions that must be taken into account by a Master, before accepting such kind of watchkeeping. Keeping in mind current amount of NOSSAN crew, requirements of working/sleeping hours, as well as strict requirements of quality watchkeeping on the bridge, there should be feasible to expand the amount of crew (deck personnel) at least by one individual, in order to ensure efficient Lookout when it is really necessary, as well as minimize average level of fatigue within crew in sake of safe navigation.

6.3. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Article 98 (c) clearly states obligations of Master after collision :...*”after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the nearest port at which it will*

call....”. After the occurrence on 15.07.2020 there was an entry in Nossan's Logbook : *“small collision”* (it is unclear estimation criteria of severity of the collision in this case); vessel just stayed steady on course and speed, continuing her voyage, disregarding means of communications: it is not in accordance with above mentioned conventional standards

7. SAFETY RECCOMENDATIONS

Due to minor consequences to involved parties TAIIB has not initiated full investigation of the collision, submitting all available data and evidences to Faroe Islands investigation authorities. However, upon the inquiry TAIIB has issued safety recommendations to THUN SHIP MANAGEMENT

- 1. Revise the amount of crew and, re-estimate standards of sole (bridge) watchkeeping (without Lookout) onboard of mv NOSSAN (as well as onboard of fleet)**
- 2. Revise Safety Management System of mv NOSSAN (and fleet) in order to oblige Masters to adhere to conventional requirements, as well as good seamanship standards**