



BRAZILIAN NAVY
DIRECTORATE OF PORTS AND COASTS
Marine Safety Superintendence

Department of Inquiries and Investigations of Navigation Accidents

FATAL CREW MEMBER ACCIDENT IN M/V "PILTENE"

Recife, Pernambuco - April 14, 2017

MARITIME SAFETY INVESTIGATION REPORT



Photo 1: M/V "PILTENE", photo provided by the Owner

Reference:

**Casualty Investigation Code, of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) –
MSC-MEPC.3 / Circ.2, 13 June, 2008 / Resolution MSC.255 (84).**



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I - LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- ISAIM - Safety Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents
- IMO - International Maritime Organization
- CPPE - Captaincy of the Ports of Pernambuco - Recife, Pernambuco
- MCP - Main Combustion Engine
- IML - Institute of Legal Medicine
- P & I - Protection and Indemnity Insurance (insurance)
- PSC – Port State Control
- PE- State of Pernambuco
- CDM - Chief Engineer
- BB - port
- BE - starboard
- MRCC - maritime rescue coordination centers
- MMSI - maritime mobile service identity
- GM - MD - Medical Navy Corps
- RN - State of Rio Grande do Norte
- TON - ton
- m - meters
- HP - horse power
- MSM - Minimum Safe Manning Certificate



II - INTRODUCTION

For the purpose of accomplishing the collection and the analysis of evidences, the identification of the causal factors and the elaboration of the recommendations of safety that are necessary, in order to avoid that in the future occur similar maritime accidents and/or incidents, the Ports Captaincy of Pernambuco (CPPE) carried out the present Safety Investigation of Marine Accidents and Incidents (ISAIM) in compliance with that laid down in the Casualty Investigation Code of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), adopted by Resolution MSC.255(84).

This Final Report is a technical document that reflects the result obtained by the CPPE in relation to the circumstances that contributed or may have contributed to unleash the occurrence and does not resort to any procedures of proof for verification of civil or criminal responsibility.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized the importance of protecting the persons responsible for the supplying of information related to the occurrence of the accident, for the use of information included in this report for ends other than the prevention of future similar accidents may lead to erroneous interpretations and conclusions.

III – SYNOPSIS

The Merchant Ship "PILTENE", IMO No. 9323376, flag of MARSHALL ISLANDS, with port of registry in MAJURO, belonging to SKRUNDA NAVIGATION INC. having as Operator LSC SHIPMANAGEMENT SIA, docked at the Port of Suape at 08:00 on April 24, 2017, coming from the Port of Itaqui, Maranhão, and destined for the Port of Aratu, Bahia.

On April 14, 2017, at 08:15 hours when sailing on the coast of Ceará, crew member (____) was found on the main deck by crew member (____) (pumping) under the following conditions:

- Unconscious, severely bruised, showing broken jaw, broken ribs, forearm near right fractured wrist and bruises in both eyes;



- At 08:30 p.m., after being notified by the Chief Mate, the Captain of the ship made a call by MMSI with his Company and then with the MRCC (Maritime Rescue Coordination Center) of Brazil, without success. After several attempts it established contact with MRCC Riga (Latvia), being attended by the doctor Dr. (____);
- Immediate action, a cervical collar was attached, broken limbs immobilized and bandages on the wounds, as well as transfer to a stateroom on the same level as the main deck floor;
- At 12:30 a.m. MRCC Natal (RN), medical cadet Dr. (____), with fluency in the English language, established contact to give the orientations requested by the ship and, upon learning of the reactions of the body of the victim, noted the absence of vital signs.
- At 1:10 p.m., Dr. (____) also in the monitoring of the situation (pupils dilated and without reaction to the light, without pulse and without breathing, cold body) declares the death of the crewman, in view of the information received by radio.

IV - GENERAL INFORMATION

a) CHARACTERISTICS OF THE M/V "PILTENE"

- Name of the vessel: "PILTENE"
- Ship IMO: 9323376
- Previous Name: xxxx
- Flag: Marshall Islands
- Previous Flag: xxxx
- MMSI #: 538002773
- Year of Construction: 2007
- Construction Site: Croatia
- Shipyard: 3 Maj Brodogradiliste d.d. Rijeka
- Port of Registry: Majuro
- Ship Type: Oil / Chemical / Tank
- Keel Beat: February 10, 2007



- Delivery Date: October 30, 2007
- Hull Material: Steel
- Owner: SKRUNDA NAVIGATION INC.
- Operator: LSC SHIPMANAGEMENT SIA
- Call Signal: V7LN6
- Deadweight: 49999 TON
- Gross Tonnage: 30641
- Net tonnage: 15301
- Length of the ship: 195,15 m
- Length between perpendiculars: 187.3 m
- Draft of the ship: 12,51 m
- Breadth: 32.2 m
- Depth: 17.81 m
- Number of Cargo Tanks: 24
- Navigation Area: Long Course
- Last port: Itaqui (State of Maranhao)
- Departure Date / Time: April 13, at 2:15 p.m.
- Port of destination: Suape - State of Pernambuco
- Date / Time Arrival in Suape (PE): April 16, at 2:00 p.m.
- Date / Time Departure from Suape: April 21 at 9:40 p.m.
- Port of Destination: Aratu - Bahia State
- Operation: Gas Discharge
- Propulsion: MCP: Diesel Engine 7 RTA 48 T-B Total Power (KW) 9,650 KW
- Total Power (HP): 13,124 HP
- Classification Society: Lloyds Register of Shipping
- P & I: Assurance Foreningen Skull.

b) Documents of the N / M "PILTENE"

Ship had a Declaration of Conformity for Transport of Petroleum, issued by the Port Authority of Maranhao, in the Port of Itaqui, valid until May 05, 2017. Ship was submitted on 04/18/2017 to the Inspection of Port State Control at the Port of Suape-PE, not showing non-conformity. All the documents were within validity.



V - ACCIDENT LOCAL DATA

- Date / Time and Place: 14 / April / 2017, 08:10 hours, Latitude 01°58'12 "South and Longitude 041°05'12"West;
- Maritime Area: Near the coast of Ceará 130 nautical miles west of Fortaleza (Photo 2); Towards 089 °, speed 11 knots; environmental conditions: Southeast / northeast wind with 3 to 4 knots and occasionally 5 knots; southeast / east waves, 1.0m / 2.0m; clear skies and good visibility.



Photo 2 - Maritime Area, near the coast of Ceará, where the body of the victim was found

VI - HUMAN FACTORS AND CREW

PARTICULARITY OF THE ACCIDENTED MEMBER OF CREW:

Full Name: (____);

Male;

Weight / Height: (____)

; Date of Birth: (____);

Age: (____);

Marital Status: (____);

Parents: (____);



Nationality: Riga - Latvia;

BRAZILIAN NAVY
Directorate of Ports and Coasts
Marine Safety Superintendence
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FATAL CREW MEMBER ACCIDENT IN M/V "PILTENE)
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Passport No. (_____) of the Republic of Latvia;

Seaman's Book: No. (_____) issued by the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands, valid from 12/01/2014 to 11/30/2019;

Certificate of Proficiency: (_____), issued by the authority of the Government of the Republic of Latvia valid from 08/20/2014 to 06/26/2019; in compliance with STCW Rule III / 4;

Boarding time on ship: 02 months and 16 days. Embark on 1/27/2017 in Ventspils;

Health Examinations: No restrictions

Death Certificate (_____- Causa Mortis :“politrauma”



TSC Shipmanagement SIA
 Vessel: PILTENE
 Flag: MARSHALL ISLANDS



Incident Report

Date, time and place of the incident: 14.04.2017 / 0815 wiper V.Kiselovs was found heavily injured on main deck aft port side

Circumstances of the incident: Suppose that fall from significant height

Narrative of the incident:

Date - Time LT	Description of Event
14.04.2017 / 0815 Pos: 01 58.2S / 041 05.2W	Heavily injured wiper [redacted] has been found by pm [redacted] main deck aft port side near the chemical store in nearly conscious condition; Master and Ch-Off have been informed
0817	PA announcement has been made: all crew have been mustered; necessary medical equipment brought to victim; crew commenced render first aid
0820	Master informed DPA and ERT Coordinator by phone; investigated symptoms of injury and victim's condition,- conscious; broken right arm near the fist, missing teeth, broken jaw, broken ribs, sever bruises around the eyes
0830	Called MRCC Brazil(Natal, Belem and Rio De Janeiro) for urgent assistance; nobody spoke in English; called to Latvian Seaman's Health Centre phone numbers as indicated in VEGM 04/22, no answer received; called CIRM - no connection at the moment / cervical collar and pressure splints have been already applied to victim and continuous control of breathing and puls
0900	Distress Message sent to SAR via INMARSAT C / control of breathing and puls / Call to CIRM again failed / contacted local GAC Agency by phone and mail for assistance
0906	Get into touch by phone with MRCC Riga for Medical advice and connection number of MRCC Brazil(in English) / control of breathing and puls / conscious
0920	Lost consciousness, commenced apply reanimation procedures - resuscitation
0940	Received from CIRM that assistance only in Mediterranean area - victim no puls, no breathing observed; continue reanimation
0944	Riga MRCC advised to continue hart massage and artificial breathing till assistance arrives
0945	Answer received from MRCC Natal about medical assistance and that they are waiting for english speaking doctor /
1010	Acknowledge msg received on VHF, MFHF / reanimation is continued
1107	MRCC Natal requested to confirm tel. Number, still waiting for doctor to arrive in MRCC / reanimation in progress
1230	Fin.Doctor has arrived at MRCC Natal, all symptoms have been described, from this moment Natal MRCC Medical Doctor conclude the death
1307 Pos: 02 003S / 039 53.0W	Received official advice by phone from Riga MRCC [redacted] cease reanimation procedures based on symptoms: eye pupils are not reacting to light wide, spots on the body, no puls no breathing, unconsciousness, cold body / victim faded away / official death has been fixed
1350	Received from Natal MRCC instruction to proceed to Suape port to repatriate the body and contacted with local GAC Agency for accordling arrangements

Master:

14.04.2017

(Signature)

(Name & Surname)

Document 1 - Accident information



REMOVED

Document 2: Medical certificate of the victim (without restrictions)



REMOVED

Document 3: Certificate of physical assessments



REMOVED

Document 4: Toxicological Exams of the victim (negative)



-----REMOVED

Document 5: Death Certificate



REMOVED

Document 6: Report of the Institute of Legal Medicine (IML)



- CREW:

The NM PILTENE's "Minimum Safe Manning Certificate (MSM)" is composed of (14) fourteen crew members, its "Crew List" consisting of twenty-three crew. The working language on board is English;

Absence of the fatally injured crew member did not affect the navigation safety conditions, without compromising the ship's "Minimum Safe Manning Certificate"

NOME	FUNÇÃO	PORTO E DATA DE EMBARQUE	TEMPO A BORDO ATÉ 14/04/2017
(-----)	Master	Amsterdam 13/03/2017	28 days

MINIMUM SAFE MANNING CERTIFICATE
 Issued under the provisions of regulation V/14.2 of the
 INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974, As Amended
 Under the authority of the Government of the
Republic of the Marshall Islands
By the Maritime Administrator
SCHEDULE 1
 8,000 OR MORE GT AND 3,000 OR MORE KW
Particulars of ship

Name of ship	PILTENE	
Distinctive number or letters	2773	
IMO number	9323376	
Port of registry	Majuro	
Gross tonnage: National Tonnage Convention, 1969	30641	
Main propulsion (kW)	9650	
Type of ship	CHEMICAL/GHL PRODUCTS TANKER	
Periodically unattended machinery space	Yes **	
Trading area restrictions	INTERNATIONAL/UNRESTRICTED	

The ship named in this document is considered to be safely manned, if when it proceeds to sea, it carries not less than the number and grades/capacities of personnel specified in the table(s) below.

Grade/Capacity	Certificate (STCW regulations)	Number of persons
Master	95 II/2	1
Chief Mate	95 II/2	1
Second Mate	95 II/1	1
Third Mate	95 II/1	1
Able Seaman *	95 II/4	3
Ordinary Seaman	95 II/4	2
1 GMDSS 1st / 2nd Class Radio Electronic Operator/Maintainer or 2 Deck Officers holding GMDSS General Operator Certificate		
Chief Engineer	95 III/2	1
1st Assistant Engineer	95 III/2	1
2nd Assistant Engineer **	95 III/1	1
3rd Assistant Engineer **	95 III/1	1
Chief Mechanic * **	95 III/4	1

Special requirements or conditions, if any:
 Manhandling arrangements shall be at the discretion of the Master but shall never be of lower standards than those provided by the STCW Convention and IAO/ILO Recommendation A.898(21).
 The grade and number of personnel listed above reflect the minimum levels of manning necessary for the safety of navigation and stability. Additional personnel as may be considered necessary for maintenance, or cargo handling and control, or work in the hold are needed for approved rest periods, are the responsibility of the master, Master, and Chief Engineer.
 Personnel maintaining a fully manned machinery space are qualified as General Purpose (GP-1), the minimum manning standard may be reduced by one (1).
 Periodically unattended machinery operation and provided a record of satisfactory Automation System (AS) operation with Classification Society requirements, the 2nd and 3rd Assistant Engineers and one (1) Chief Mechanic are not required.
 *Applicable only to Masters and to officers and ratings in the deck and engine departments.

Issued at London, England, U.K., on the **30th** day of October, 2007

Deputy Commissioner of Maritime Affairs
 Republic of the Marshall Islands

Special Agent

MS 262 (1) 0001

Document 7: Minimum Safe Manning



(_____)	Chief Officer	Ventspils 27/01/2017	02 months e 16 days
(_____)	Pumpman	Ventspils 27/01/2017	02 months e 16 days
(_____)	Motorman	New York 23/10/2016	05 months e 17 days
(_____)	Wiper	Ventspils 27/01/2017	02 months e 16 days

- Minimum Safe Manning - meeting the requirements of the STCW Convention, both in quantity and qualification.

- Periods of work, rest and fatigue: nothing irregular was found.

- Accommodation for the crew - this is new ship, offering comfortable accommodation for the crew, in general.

- Use of alcohol, drugs and medicines used by the crew involved in the accident - None.

In the records found on board, all crew members perform a work routine of 8 hours with rest of 16 hours, in the period of 24 hours. No overtime work records were found that compromised the rest or created a fatigue condition for the crew, except for the Chief Engineer (CDM), which does not record overtime, but there were overtime hours.

No evidence of alcohol and / or drug use was found. Prohibition on alcohol and drug use and random crew reports were up to date. The work contracts and health certificates of all crew members were up-to-date and unobserved as to the medical prescription of medication use.

VII - CHRONOLOGICAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

• On 04/14/2017, NM " PILTENE ", IMO 9323376, flying the flag of the Marshall Islands, from the port of Itaqui (MA) to the Port of Suape (PE), sailed in the position of Latitude 01°58 ' 12 "South and Longitude 041°05'12"West; ECDIS map about 130 miles west of the city of Fortaleza, heading 089 °, speed of 11 knots, when at 08:15 p.m. on April 14, 2017, the Captain of the ship, (_____), it



was immediately notified that crewmember (_____) had been found lying on the main deck, near the depot of chemicals in critical condition, with broken forearms, broken ribs, fractured jaw, loss of teeth, a diagonal pectoral region on the left side and marked bruising around the eyes; lay wrapped in puddles of blood;

According to the interview conducted, Mr. (_____) testifies that he found the crewman victimized at 08:10 a.m., still alive and subconscious;

Then he notified the Chief Mate (he was in the center of charge) and so to the Captain;

At 8:17 p.m. - The first emergency care was given with the placement of a cervical vest, immobilization of the fractured areas, bandages on the wounds and transfer to a stateroom on the same level as the floor of the main deck;

VIII- PROCEDURES AFTER ACCIDENT

At 08:20 p.m. - The LSC SHIPMANAGEMENT S / A, 1, Elizabetes str, Riga, Latvia is informed of the accident;

At 08:30 p.m. - Successive calls were made in the English language to MRCC Brazil for Natal, Belem and Rio de Janeiro, and there were no answers. At the same time, calls were made to Satvian Seamens Health without any contact. Commander (_____) thought about the possibility of a medical air evacuation, due to the serious condition that was the crew member;

At 09: 06hs - Established contact with MRCC Riga and with MRCC Brazil. MRCC Brazil did not have availability of doctor fluent in English, which would allow the maintenance of dialogue for the necessary emergency guidelines;

At 9:20 p.m. - Victim loses heartbeat and consciousness, resuscitation procedures begin;

At 09:44 p.m. - MRCC Brazil advises to continue the procedures of resuscitation and wait for the arrival of a doctor fluent in English;

At 12:30 p.m. - After contact with the medical assistance that, upon learning of the absence of vital signs, concludes the death of the crew member (____);

At 1:07 p.m. Dr. (____), from MRCC Riga, in view of the information



sent, also determines the closure of resuscitation procedures;

At 1:50 pm - Ship receives instructions from MRCC Natal to proceed to the Port of Suape to repatriate the body and carry out legal procedures with the Federal Police and the Representative of the Brazilian Maritime Authority;

At 4:30 p.m. - Salvamar Northeast sends an email to Captain (_____) requesting confirmation of death;

At 20:00 pm - Captain of the NM "PILTENE" confirms the death.

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Document 8: Statement by the Commander of the ship that the victim was on his rest time

IX- CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT



Personal Injury - Yes, with the death of a crew member.

- Environmental damage - There was not.

- Material damages - None.

X- EXPERT EXAMINATIONS

In the examination of what was verified with the interviews of the witnesses with the narratives detailing the circumstances of the occurrence, were observed:

1 - Declaration of the Commander of the ship informs that the victim was on his rest time and his next working hour would be in the period from 08:00 to 12:00 on 04/14/2017 (Document 8);

2 - The victim was found at 08:10 p.m. in still attire (Photo 3), making it appear that the time of the event occurred at a time still far from the assumption of service;

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Photo 3 - Crew member being immobilized after the accident

3 - Maritime toxicology tests, performed for contracting with the Company, present "negative" results (Document 4);

4 - Crew member Mr. (____), "motor man", of Latvian nationality, Seaman's Book No. (____), certifies that he encountered the victim between 00:00 and 01:00 am on 04/04/2017 on the 2nd deck of the superstructure. The witness states that he crossed with the victim in the corridor on his way to his cabin, coming from the ship's laundry, not observing any signs of behavior change;



5 - The crew member, Mr. (____), Immediate of the vessel, a Latvian national, Seaman's Book No. (____), testifies in his testimony that, the moment he arrived at the deck, he observed that the victim lay in puddles of blood that already had the appearance of coagulation;

6 - Evidences point to a drop height of 10 to 12 meters of platform on floor at the level of the free-fall lifeboat, signs of footprints of bare feet are found in the place (Photos # 6, 7, 8 and 9);

7 - The platform protrudes for port side and is endowed with baluster (guardrail) with height of approximately 1,20m. Several marks on the side of the first level of the balustrade are observed, inducing a support action aiming at the rise of the body to transpose the baluster (Photo nº 5); The victim, according to his "Physical Examination Report / Certificate", issued by the Administration of the Flag on 01/19/2017, had weight of (____) kg, height (____) cm and had good physical conditions (Document 3); 8 - The area in question is near the chimney of the ship, and its floor is subject to soots coming from the discharge of gases from the generators and main engine (Photos #. 6, 7, 8 and 9);

9 - Witnesses state in testimony that they have not heard any strange noise or suspicious movements;

10 - The victim was found in the prone position as quoted in the interview with Mr. (____), Chief Mate;

11 - Height of the fall, approximately: 12m (Photos # 10 and 11);

12- Impact on rigid and inelastic surface:

The impact thus justifies the severe injuries suffered: loss of teeth, broken ribs, fractured mandible, forearm near the wrist also fractured and incision on the left side of the breast, hematomas around both eyes and detailed in the "Tanatoscopic Expert Exam" nº (____) of the Legal Medical Institute (____), (Document 9), linked to the Secretariat of Social Defense of the government of the State of Pernambuco.

13 - At 08:30 p.m. - attempts by the Captain to establish contact with the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centers (MRCC) in Brazil (Natal, Belém and Rio de Janeiro), Latvian Seamen's Health Center and CIRM, all without success, as record in "Log



Book";

14 - 09: 06hs - Establish contact with Riga MRCC obtaining medical support;

15- 09: 20hs - Loss of vital signs and resuscitation procedure initiated;

16 - 09: 45hs - Established contact with MRCC Natal when they informed to wait for a doctor who had some knowledge of the English language, that allowed to maintain a communication;


17 - At 12:30 p.m. - Contact with MRCC Brazil doctor who concludes by the death declaration of the crew member.

18 - It was not possible to verify that the injured crew member was sent by unknown person to the fall where it was found.

19 - It was not possible to confirm that the injured crew member suffered from deep psychological depression or even only depression.




Photos 4 and 5 - Overview of the accident scenario



Photos 6 and 7 - Signs of footprints on the balustrade and on the deck .



Photos 8 and 9 - Signs of footprints on the balustrade and on the deck of the lifeboat



Photos 10 and 11 - Main deck area (port side), where the body of the victim was found



Photos 12 - Main deck area (port side), where the body of the victim was found



XI- ANALYSIS AND CAUSEAL FACTORS

In examining what was found during the analysis and collection of evidence in the Maritime Safety Investigation and in the interview of the witnesses, it can be deduced:

- a) Difficulty of establishing contact with MRCC BRAZIL;
- b) Difficulty of maintaining communication in the English language being necessary triggering of search plan to collect a doctor with knowledge in English language;
- c) Long time interval to offer emergency assistance (04 hours);
- d) Absence of vital signs 50 minutes after the first attempt of unsuccessful communication.
- e) In the examination of what was verified during the analysis and collection of evidence in the Maritime Safety Investigation and in the interview of the witnesses, it can be deduced:

1. That the death of a person aboard the ship, (_____), who served as a wiper, does not point to a root cause directly related to the operation of the ship and did not result in any material damage which compromises the safety of navigation or structural integrity or the occurrence of damage to the environment;

2 - It was not possible to attribute a "determining factor" that contributed as a motivator to the deliberate and reckless act of the crew member.

XII - PRELIMINARY LESSONS LEARNED AND CONCLUSION

- Determining Factor: it was not possible to attribute factors or motivating factors that would contribute to the action of the crew member or other agent.

- The accident does not point to a root cause that is directly related to the operation of the ship and did not result in any material damage that would compromise the safety of navigation or structural integrity or the occurrence of environmental damage.

- There was difficulty of communication and lack of doctors in the service of the MRCC (Salvamar Brazil) who have the capacity to maintain dialogue in the English language to allow an understanding on emergency guidelines to foreign ships in transit



in Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters.

XIII - SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

1° - In accordance with the SOLAS Convention, Chapter IX, Rule 3 (1), the Company must to carry out an evaluation of Safety Management (ISM-Code) of the vessel, regarding the establishment of rules that allow the isolation, at night, of the doors of the corridors of crew cabins at the level of the decks in the superstructure, not allowing access to the external areas which run the starboard and port platforms;

2° - All crew members must follow daily the habits of the people on board in order to identify possible behavioral changes that can generate unequal conditions of personal security breach, especially if there is access to the Internet that allows communication with family or affective relationships.

3° - The Captain must be advised when a crew member sees someone in immediate danger, recording the time and seeking to remove him immediately.

4° - The time between the first attempt to contact the competent bodies (08: 30hs) and the establishment of contact (09: 45hs), without the occurrence of an effective Medical Assistance, due to lack of doctor with knowledge of the English language , was a contributing factor for the death of the crew member who lost their vital signs at 09:20 p.m. As a preventive measure, it is necessary to provide physicians in the service of MRCC (Salvamar Brazil) who have the capacity to maintain dialogue in the English language to allow an understanding of emergency guidelines to foreign ships in transit in Brazilian Jurisdictional Waters.



X – ANEX

SHIP'S PARTICULARS OF THE M/V "PILTENE"

MT "PILTENE"

SHIP'S PARTICULARS

Official No: 2773 DNV No: 25922 IMO No: 9323376 Lloyd's No: 9323376 MMSI No: 538002773 AAIC - SU04
 FLAG: MARSHALL ISLANDS PORT: MAJURO PANAMA SIN: 3010407

Year built	Call sign	Inmarsat number	(t)		TONNAGE					
					International		Panama		Suez	
				GT	NT	GT	NT	GT	NT	
2007	V7LN6	Tel: 773 930 637 Tel: 44 203 6087 892 Fax: 764806369 Sat C: 453832794 E-mail: piltene@lscships.lv	DWT 49999	DISPL MT 61324	30641 (SBT) 7159 Red. gt 23482	15301		25423	31575,93	27484,44

CLASS LLOYD: Double Hull Oil and Chemical Tanker, Ship Type 2&3, ESP, *IWS, LI, SPM, Ice Class 1B at max draft 12,798 (BOK), LMC, IGS, UMS, COW, ShipRight (E, SCM), Structure designed at ambient air temp. -20 deg. C

OWNERS: SKRUNDA NAVIGATION INC.
 C/o LATVIAN SHIPPING COMPANY
 1, Elizabetes str., Riga LV 1010, LATVIA

MAIN DIMENSIONS:

Length over all	195,158 m
Length between perpendiculars	187,300 m
Length at Inter Convention Tonnage Measurement(1969)	188,120 m
Breadth moulded	32,200 m
Depth moulded amidship	17,81 m
Max summer draft	12,518 m
Allowance for fresh water	271 mm
Free board: tropical	5,066 m
summer	5,326 m
winter	5,586 m
Tons per cm of draft: 12,518 m	56,8 t
Height keel-top of mast	47,00 m
Distance : bridge to bow	165,5 m
bridge to stern	29,8 m
Bridge front - mid point manifold	67,50 m
Bow/stern - to mid point manifold	97,06 / 98,10 m
between manifolds	2,00 m
manifold to deck	2,10 m
manifold to rail	4,60 m
manifold to grating of spill box	0,90 m
manifold to water level	min / max 7,40 / 12,40 m
Flat side at loaded condition	96,00 m
at ballast condition	87,00 m

SHIPYARD: 3 Maj Brodogradiliste d.d. Rijeka – Croatia
 Keel laid: 10.02.2007 Ship launched: 14.07.2007
 Ship delivered: 30.10.2007 Flag hoisted: 30.10.2007

MACHINERY:
 Main Engine – 7 RTA 48 T-B
 Nominal Output - 13124 hp (9650 kW)
 Fuel - IFO 380 cst
 Auxiliary diesel-generators: 3 x 960 kW, Fuel - IFO 380
 Boilers: 2 x 10,0 t/h, exhaust gas boiler – 1x1,5 t/h

Speed: (knots)	Loaded	Ballast
Dead Slow	4,4	4,8
Slow	5,3	6,4
Half	8,4	8,5
Full maneuvering	10,2	11,7

Fuel consumption:	IFO	MDO
Service speed 14.0 knts	35.0 t + 3.0	-
Max speed 14.5 knts	37.2 t + 3.0	-
In port / idle	6.0 t	-
In port / discharge	12.0 t	9.0 t
Cargo heating: summer / winter	10.0 t	-
Tank washing	15.0 t	5.0 t
Inerting cargo tanks (IGS)	-	9.0 t
Bunker capacity:	1590.0 t	190.0 t

MOORING ARRANGEMENTS
HYDRAULIC WINCHES
 Double 2 fwd + 1 fwd main deck
 Double 2 aft + 1 aft main deck
 Winding end D=520 mm
 Winding part D=520 mm
BITTS (D x h x L x SWL)
 4 fwd + 8 aft + 10 deck - 63t / 32t / 20t
 ROPES: 8 fwd + 8 aft D60mm
WIRES: 4 fwd + 4 aft D=32 mm

ANCHORING ARRANGEMENTS:
 2 windlass - brake's capacity - 52 t
 continuous pulling power - 16,7 t
 Chain: 2 x 12 shackles (shackle = 27,5 m)
 D=76 mm
SPM ARRANGEMENT:
 Smit Bracket – SWL 200 t
 Max size of link – 76 mm
 Fairlead: 600 x 450 mm, SWL – 200 t
 Bitts: 4 x 63 t
CRANES: SWL
 at manifolds midship 10,0 t
 aft (for loading stores) 4,0 t

IGS: capacity – 4200 m³, inerting all tanks – 36 hrs, deck seal – semidry
Venting: P/V valves at all tanks, settings – pressure 2100, vacuum 350 mm Wg
Gauging: SAAB Tankradar at all cargo and slop tanks, retention tank
Vapour locks: d= 25x460 mm, for Ullaging, for sampling 48x801,0.43 ltr
Vapour Recovery System: connection 12", fwd + aft of cargo manifold

Emergency Towing Equipment :	Bow / Stern thrusters	No
Towing pennant length	90 m	Propeller- 8.0 m Fix. Blades- Right
SWL towing system	200 t	Screw immerse at draft 6.40 m
Fairlead: 600x 450 mm, SWL 200 t		Rudder immerse at draft 9.30 m

Cargo Handling:	Cargo tanks (98%) (m ³)		Ballast tanks (SBT) (100%) (m ³)	
	I	II	I	II
Cargo Pumps: 15 hydraulic deepwell pumps - 12 pumps - 550 m ³ /h capacity - 2 pumps - 300 m ³ /h capacity/ 1 pump -100 m ³	1P + 1S + 2P	2S + 3P + 3S	1P + 1S	1694 + 1865
Cargo manifolds: 4 x 12" each side, midships	4P + 4S + 5S	5P + 6P + 6S	2P + 2S	1841 + 1669
Reducers: 8-16", 4-12", 4-10", 4-8", 2- 6"	5004 + 4992 + 5004		3P + 3S	1654 + 1826
Cargo heating: Deck heater for each tank, 5°/ day	4992 + 4909 + 4896		4P + 4S	1821 + 1650
Tank cleaning: 2 Fixed washing machines per tank			5P + 5S	1640 + 1812
Tanks coating: Hempadur 15500 /epoxy/			6P + 6S	2146 + 1954
SBT BALLAST HANDLING: 2 hydraulic pumps, 1000 m ³ /h capacity each	Total capacity of cargo tanks:	56190.15	Forepeak	1710
	Capacity of Sloptanks P + S	663 + 663	Afterpeak	580
	Total cargo capacity	57517.45	SBT capacity:	23850.44